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Abstract - The paper formalizes some of the interactions 
between inter-national and inter-temporal problems of 
policy coordination through the analysis of the 
implications of the synchronization (or not) of election 
dates on international policy cooperation. This makes it 
possible the determination of the gains and losses of 
international policy coordination and to an analysis of 
how the synchronization of election dates may help 
(electoral) international policy coordination. 
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1. Introduction 
The recent worldwide economic crisis has 
caused economic agents to be concerned with the 
design of institutions that, by their nature, will help 
overcome the problems that have affected many 
countries. In particular, the focus has been placed on 
how different countries can cooperate in putting into 
practice economic policies coordinated at 
international level in order to overcome the economic 
crisis. 
As a matter of fact, despite some interest in the 
design of international institutions (Morales & 
Padilla, 1995; Schubert & von Wangenheim, 2006) 
and a considerable interest in the international 
coordination of economic policies (Miller & Salmon, 
1990; Miller et al., 1991), the fact is that the electoral 
dimension in these matters was always an issue to 
which the literature has devoted little attention 
(Easaw & Garratt, 1996; Lohmann, 1993; Tabellini, 
1990). This is a disconcerting fact as it corresponds 
to an ignorance of an issue, i.e. the time horizons of 
governments (Caleiro, 2009), which is obviously 
relevant in the international coordination of economic 
policies within the framework of participation in 
some kind of economic institution. 
For instance, concerning the third stage of the 
Economic and Monetary Union, the European 
Commission (1997: 26) acknowledged at the time 
that giving up national monetary policy could involve 
costs if countries experienced de-synchronized 
business cycles. Despite this concern about the 
importance of business cycle synchronization, little 
research has been done on the importance of 
temporal horizons for business cycles 
synchronization and, to the best of our knowledge, 
almost none has been done on the impact of the 
synchronization of election dates on the 
synchronization of business cycles between 
economies. Some exceptions are Breuss (2008), 




In order to fill part of the gap in the literature, the 
paper formalizes some of the interactions between 
inter-national and inter-temporal problems of policy 
coordination through the analysis of the implications 
of the synchronization (or not) of election dates on 
international policy cooperation. In doing so, it is our 
objective also to help answering the following 
question: “Does international cooperation or 
coordination of economic policies become easier or 
harder when domestic elections across countries are 
synchronized?” (Caleiro, 1996: 11). Specifically, the 
paper adds to the literature by computing the 
cooperative and non-cooperative solutions in a model 
where governments face elections at possibly distinct 
moments of time. This leads us to the determination 
of the gains and losses of international policy 
coordination and to an analysis of how the 
synchronization of election dates may help (electoral) 
international policy coordination.  
That said, the rest of the paper is structured as 
follows. Section 2 presents the two-country model 
that will be used throughout the paper. Section 3 
presents the non-cooperative solution for the 
synchronized and non-synchronized elections cases. 
Section 4 presents the cooperative solutions for these 
two cases. Section 5 concludes by showing the 
circumstances under which is it better to have 
synchronized elections. 
                                                 
1
 Also, in Caleiro (2000) a difference games case was 
considered to study how distinct electoral period 
lengths may influence the benefits from international 
policy coordination.  
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2. The Two-Country Model 
In order to analyze the possible consequences on 
international policy coordination of electorally-
motivated governments, let us consider that voters 
take into account the evolution of output, which is 




   (1) 
where ty  is the output growth rate, tm  and 

tm  
are, respectively, the domestic and foreign money 
growth rates, and z is a supply shock.
2
 As a faster 
expansion of the domestic money supply is supposed 
to increase domestic output, the domestic monetary 
multiplier, a, is assumed to be positive (but less than 
1). Also, due to the ambiguity of the monetary 
spillover effects, no sign will be imposed on the 
foreign monetary multiplier, b, though it will be 
assumed that, in absolute terms, it is less powerful 
than its domestic counterpart. To sum up, 0 ≤ |b| < a 
< 1.  
We also consider that the government cannot 
freely manipulate its policy instruments without 
costs, which we assume are taken into account by the 
electorate, and, thus, will be viewed as popularity 
costs. In fact, as considered in Dolado et al. (1994), if 
mt = πt, it is reasonable to assume the following 




ttt yv    
where β is a positive constant measuring the 




The economy of the foreign country has an 









1 22   ttt yv   
                                                 
2
 Relation (1) is borrowed from Dolado et al. (1994). 
Another possible formulation could be 
,ybmamy ttt 

 where y  is the rate of 
growth of natural output (Canzonery & Gray, 1985). 
3
 For simplicity, it will be assumed that yt and πt are 
measured from the most desirable values. 
4
 Both economies are to be structurally identical, 
except in what concerns voters’ output-inflation 
preferences and voters’ memory. Straightforwardly, 
an asymmetric and/or a n-country version of the 
model can be considered. 
Following the definition of Cooper & John 






























This means that, when b > 0 (resp. b < 0), the 
monetary policies are strategic substitutes (resp. 
complements), since an increase in the foreign money 
supply growth rate decreases (resp. increases) the 
marginal payoff of domestic money supply growth 
rate and therefore weakens (resp. reinforces) the 
effect of the domestic monetary policy.
 6
 
In accordance to Gärtner (1994; 2000), let us 
assume that election periods (E) and non-election 
periods (N) alternate such that, when t = E, t – 1 = N, 
t – 1 = E, etc., and that election results depend on the 
present and previous voter utility streams as follows: 




  ttt vvV     (4) 
where Vt is the government vote share, and µ can 
be associated with the rate of decay of voters’ 
memory.  
Given this set-up, it is obvious that a perfect 
synchronization of elections will occur when election 
periods (E) correspond to the same value of t for both 
economies; otherwise non-synchronized elections 
will occur. This issue plays no special role in the non-
cooperative solutions as will be shown in the 
following section. 
3. The Nash solutions 
As is well known, in the non-cooperative 
solution, each player optimizes her/his own objective 
function taking as given the reaction of the other 
player, i.e. both maximize their objective functions 
(3), (4), subject to equations (1), (2) but without 
considering the other government’s instrument as 
                                                 
5
 Strategic complementarity (resp. substitutability) 
corresponds to the case where an increase in the 
actions of all players except player i increases (resp. 
decreases) the marginal return to player i’s action. 
6
 Taking into account (1) and (2), this also means 
that, in case of a positive (resp. negative) monetary 
spillover effect, monetary policies can be substitutes 
(resp. complements) since an increase in the foreign 
money growth rate will induce, by itself, an increase 
(resp. decrease) in domestic output growth, which 
will be compensated by a decrease (resp. increase) in 
the domestic money growth rate (Bulow et al., 1985). 
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either under its own control or independent of its own 
policy. Hence, if we assume that both governments 
want to maximize their vote share at the election 
period by a non-cooperative procedure, the optimal 
reaction functions can be derived as follows. 
Let us consider that, for the domestic economy, t 
= E. In this case, the two-period monetary policy that 






































            (6) 
In a similar way we can derive the reaction 
















































Given the particular form of (5), (6), (7), and (8), 
the Nash solution for any period t, regardless of 
whether it is an election period for either of the 












































































Clearly, non-cooperative monetary policies, (9), 
will be such that the existence of negative (resp. 
                                                 
7
 Note that in the reaction functions (5) and (6), tm  
and 1tm  are, by construction, the values 
corresponding to the election and to the non-election 
periods, respectively; each depending on the 
monetary policy that the foreign government will 
implement during t and t – 1, i.e. 

tm  and 

1tm  , 
which, in turn, correspond to the other country’s 
election and non-election policies only if elections are 
synchronized. In other words, while 
E
mmt   and 
N
mmt 1 , the same does not happen necessarily 
for 

tm  and 

1tm  appearing in equations (6) and (5). 
In the case of election periods synchronization, 
 
E
mmt  and 







  Emmt 1 . 
positive) supply shocks induces monetary expansions 
(resp. depressions).  
The combination of the spillover and strategic 
effects clearly identifies the usual non-internalization 
of those effects when governments assume non-
cooperative behavior. In fact, for negative (resp. 
positive) monetary spillover effects – which 
correspond also to strategic complementarity (resp. 
substitutability) – the non-cooperative policies will 
over (resp. under)-react to negative (resp. positive) 
supply shocks.  
Straightforwardly, the non-cooperative 






































































which means that non-cooperative monetary 




Concerning the non-cooperative solutions (9) 
and (10), it should be noted that: 
1) If z = 0, i.e. in case of no conflict between 
domestic objectives, t , 

t , and international 
ones, ,ty

ty , this solution should coincide with 
the cooperative solution characterized by 
0 tt mm . No gains from cooperation 
would arise. This would be the case because: (a) 
if each government only cares about its own 
domestic objectives, t , ,

t  they would 
establish 0 tt mm  and this, in turn, would 
also be the most convenient policy for 
international objectives, ,ty  

ty ; and (b) if each 
government would only care about ,ty

ty  they 
would establish  0 tt mm  and this, in turn, 
would also be the most convenient policy for 
domestic objectives t , 

t . 
2) If ,0   i.e. when both governments 
would have only domestic objectives, in the 
sense that voters only take into account t  and 

t , then, once again, no gains from cooperation 
are to be obtained. 
                                                 
8
 In fact, the following relations are valid: 




  NENE tt yam   
Hence, sign  ty  sign 

ty  sign 

tm  sign tm . 
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3) Obviously, the inexistence of monetary spillover 
effects, i.e. b = 0, will make non-cooperative 
solutions equivalent to possible cooperative 
ones. 
4) In any other situation, there is a potential for 
gains from cooperation. In particular, acting non-
cooperatively, governments do not even explore 
the strategic dynamics resulting from both 
periods. As 
NE
VV   and  
NE
VV , there is no 
distinction between election and non-election 
periods. More precisely, one should expect 
(electoral) gains from cooperation if 
governments internalize the spillover and 
strategic effects, whether the distinction between 
election and non-election periods is exploited or 
not. This leads us to the analysis of cooperative 
solutions which, due to the dynamic structure of 
the situation, assume an interesting form. 
4. The Cooperative Solutions 
It is in the cooperative solutions that the 
synchronization of election periods becomes 
important. In fact, as it will be shown below, the 
difference in the dynamic behavior of the economies 
resulting from a coincidence (or not) of election 
periods can be decisive in the determination of those 
solutions and in their specific form according to the 
two possible situations: synchronized and staggered 
elections (Cahuc & Kempf, 1997). We first consider 
the synchronized elections case. 
 
4.1. The Synchronized Elections Case 
In this case, at some moment t, both 
governments face the same kind of period. Assuming 
that the maximization of votes at t = E continues to 
be the objective, the cooperative solutions for the 
optimal policy for t and t – 1 are derived from the 
maximization of a weighted global vote share 
function as follows: 
  .1  tt
CS
t VwwVV  
If we assume that t = E, the optimal cooperative 
policies are given by the solutions of the following 
systems of two equations: 
   
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Given these solutions, it is straightforward to see 
that in the case where the domestic government's 




























































































which corresponds to the use of the domestic 
control variable, tm , in order to obtain the other 
government's objective for ,ty  while this also would 
be compatible with the best possible policy for the 
other government, i.e. .0tm  At the other 
























































































which now would be the best possible situation 
for the domestic country.
9
 This just serves to 
demonstrate that cooperation will always be refused 
by one of the players if the weight w is not 
intermediate enough. In fact, unless one assumes 
extreme cases like β = 0, β* = 0, or z = 0, it is always 
possible to obtain sustainable cooperative solutions 
given that there exists an intermediate weight leading 
to welfare gains to both governments.  
Given the above-discussion it is possible to 
precisely determine what cooperative solutions 
superiority over non-cooperative solutions will mean 
for monetary policy. Let us consider the cooperative 
first-order conditions given by (11) and (12) 
evaluated at the Nash solutions given by (9) and (10): 
   
 










































































                                                 
9
 Note that, contrary to the non-cooperative solution, 
the sign of the monetary spillover effects would 
matter for the signs of the (domestic) monetary 
policy and domestic output growth. 
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Given that the existence of positive (resp. 
negative) supply shocks, z, imply monetary 
depressions (resp. expansions) accompanied by 
positive (resp. negative) output growth, (13) makes it 
possible to confirm that: 
For the case where positive monetary 
spillovers, b > 0, are associated with positive supply 
shocks, z > 0, governments acting non-cooperatively 
would decrease money supply less than if they 
cooperate, this resulting in an over-expansion of 
output. 
1. For the case where positive monetary spillovers, 
b > 0, are associated with negative supply 
shocks, z < 0, governments acting non-
cooperatively would increase money supply less 
than if they cooperate, this resulting in an over-
depression of output. 
2. For the case where negative monetary spillovers, 
b < 0, are associated with positive supply shocks, 
z > 0, governments acting non-cooperatively 
would decrease money supply more than if they 
cooperate, this resulting in an under-expansion of 
output. 
3. For the case where negative monetary spillovers, 
b < 0, are associated with negative supply 
shocks, z < 0, governments acting non-
cooperatively would increase money supply 
more than if they cooperate, this resulting in an 
under-depression of output. 
Plainly, the previous conclusions were taken 
assuming non-zero parameter values.
10
 Note, 
however, that from (13) one can confirm what was 
said before about the b = 0, β = β* = 0, w = 0, and w 
= 1 cases. Concerning the parameters µ and µ* the 
following discussion is relevant. 
As we know from the non-election periods 
cooperative solutions (12), one should note that it is 
precisely through these solutions that the parameters 
concerning voters’ memory, µ and µ*, exert their 
influence, which does not happen in the non-
cooperative solution. This result is, by itself, 
important, given that it highlights the decisive role of 
voters’ memory in the determination of the possible 
gains from cooperation and, therefore, in the 
sustainability of cooperative solutions. To shed more 
light on this issue, note that, if voters in the domestic 
economy have no memory, i.e. when µ = 0, it is 
optimal to implement, in the non-election periods, the 
following policy: 
                                                 
10
 If, on the contrary, for example b = 0, then (13) 
would all be zero, that obviously meaning that the 


































which is quantitatively the same determined for 
the election periods when w = 0 – mutatis mutandis 
for w = 1 and µ* = 0 – but qualitatively different 
given that, because domestic voters only take into 
account what happens in t = E, the domestic 
government will not be, in principle, worse off.
11
 It is 
thus apparent that voters’ memory can be used to 
benefit (more) a particular government at a particular 
moment in time and both governments agree on that 
cooperative exploitation of voters’ memory. This is 
certainly true if elections are synchronized, but much 
more explicit if elections are non-synchronized, as 
will be shown in the following section. 
4.2. The Non-Synchronized Elections Case 
It is probably illuminating if we start the study of 
this situation by pointing out that, although election 
periods in one country overlap non-election periods 
in the other country, their non-synchronized position 
in time can be irrelevant if voters possess perfect 
memory. In fact, if µ = µ* = 1, each government will 
have to consider non-election periods as equally 
important as election periods, if maximizing the 
number of votes is the economic policy objective.
12
 
In this case, the sustainable non-synchronized 
elections cooperative solution coincides with the 
synchronized elections solution and, as we have seen, 
this can be welfare-improving for both governments. 
To continue emphasizing the importance of 
voters' memory, let us assume the other extreme 
                                                 
11
Note that if µ = 0 then 0
N
v . This means that the 
foreign government achieves the best possible result 
in all non-election periods. Thus, on the one hand, 
this government would want its own voters not to 
forget its performance easily and, on the other hand, 
the foreign government can use that high(est) level of 
popularity to relax during the election periods and 
deliberately induce an electoral defeat of the 
domestic government if a change in the other player 
of the game is seen to be a better alternative. In this 
case, in the election periods, there would be an 
increased probability of non-cooperative solutions. 
Also note that by proceeding in this manner the 
foreign government would be using a satisficing 
approach – to ensure the re-election but not 
necessarily maximizing votes – in order to maximize 
the expected length in power (Frey & Ramser, 1976). 
12
 From (11) and (12) it is obvious that the optimal 
policies for moment t = E would be the same as for 
the previous moment t = N. 
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point, i.e. µ = µ* = 0, which we can associate with 
the zero memory situation. In this case, both 
governments would prefer to have non-synchronized 
rather than synchronized elections because, through 
policy coordination, one government can use the 
other country’s policy to win its own elections. In a 
sense, one can say that this would be the most 
favorable case for electorally-induced international 
policy coordination between governments that, at a 
domestic level, implement electorally-induced 
national policies. To confirm this line of reasoning let 
us derive the corresponding cooperative solution 
analytically. 
Assume that, for the domestic economy, t = E, 
while for the other economy, t = N. In this period, 
both instruments tm  and 

tm  can be used to achieve 
the two objectives for inflation and output growth of 
the domestic government. Thus, electorally-induced 
policy cooperation between the two governments can 
be expressed by the following assignment of 














































Obviously, this solution would be the same as in 
the synchronized elections case if only the interests 
of the domestic government were taken into account  
but now will be acceptable by the other country’s 
government if there is a commitment that in the next 
period – when elections take place in the other 

















                                                 
13
 A possible solution to the temptation to defeat, 
hence non-credible commitments, can be obtained 
using the infinitely repeated interaction argument. If 
(infinite) non-cooperation follows after some defeat 
this will certainly constitute enough reason for 
governments to respect the commitment and always 



































Clearly, those solutions are (extreme) cases of 
the general solution that follows. The cooperative 
solution for the non-synchronized case will thus 
result from the following program: 
















    
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The first-order conditions are: 
   
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   












      (15) 
The cooperative solution is, then, the solution 
 
ENEN
mmmm ,,,  of the above system. Clearly, the 
extreme cases for the solution will not be possible to 
implement since: 
                                                 
14
 Note that, because the non-synchronized elections 
case is being analysed, when one economy is facing a 
period of type E (resp. N) the other will be facing a 






m  are monetary policies implemented at the 
same time. 
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1) When w = 0, i.e. when the objectives of the 
domestic government would be completely 







mm . In this case, the domestic 
government would not, in general, accept this 
solution. 
2) When w = 1, i.e. when the objectives of the 
foreign government would be completely 
ignored, we would have 0
EN





. In this case, the foreign 
government would not, in general, accept this 
solution. 
5. Conclusion 
As we have seen, from the comparisons between 
non-cooperative solutions and synchronized elections 
cooperative solutions, it results in the importance of 
monetary spillover, b, and of supply shocks, z, 
effects. Naturally, in the comparison of cooperative 
solutions between the synchronized and non-
synchronized elections cases, voters’ memory plays 
the major role. In fact, as above mentioned, in the 
case of perfect memory, µ = µ* = 1, the synchronized 
elections solutions are equivalent to the non-
synchronized elections case.
15
 At the other extremity, 
when µ = µ* = 0, having non-synchronized elections 
is always better for electorally-motivated 
governments. 
That said, one then can question the possibility 
of an absolute preference to have synchronized 
elections. To clarify this issue, let us consider the 
first-order conditions corresponding to the two cases, 
i.e. (11), (12) and (14), (15). Putting in pairs the 





















are the sufficient conditions for the equivalence 
between the two set of solutions. Using these 
conditions as thresholds in a reasoning similar to the 
one used above to compare the Nash solutions with 
the synchronized elections counterparts, one can 
infer, after some algebra, that:
16
 
                                                 
15
 And, in particular, if β = β* = 0, and/or b = 0, 
and/or z = 0, there is coincidence also with the non-
cooperative solutions. 
16
 Note that the following conclusions can easily be 
accommodated to various other cases, for example 
the study of benevolent governments which attribute 
1) If, for one or both of the economies, voters 
remember election periods as well as non-
election periods, governments will be indifferent 
between the decision to synchronize or stagger 
elections. 
2) If, in both economies, voters forget the past, then 
both governments will be better off in the case of 
non-synchronized elections. 
3) If, in both economies, voters happen to consider 
non-election periods more important than 
election periods for their voting decisions then, 
once again, both governments will prefer to have 
non-synchronized elections. 
4) If, in one of the economies, voters consider non-
election periods more important than election 
periods, whereas, in the other economy, the 
opposite is true, then both governments will 
prefer to have synchronized elections. 
To sum up, there are, in general, gains from 
cooperation, no matter the degree of synchronization 
between elections. Moreover, and more important, if 
elections are non-synchronized, there may be scope 
for both governments to cooperate neglecting their 
domestic interests at non-election periods in order to 
benefit electorally the other country which is facing 
an election period. This may be viewed as a strategic 
use/evolution of the welfare weights (Caleiro, 1996: 
12). 
Among possible refinements of the model under 
consideration, one can reconsider voters’ behavior, 
i.e. assume some prospectiveness and/or strategic 
voting by an experienced electorate, and/or even 
assume asymmetries concerning supply shocks, z, 
and/or spillover effects, b, or even in what concerns 
the size of the economies.
17
 These may constitute 
interesting avenues for future research. 
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